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ABSTRACT 
Recent web-based cyber attacks are evolving into a new form of attacks such as private information theft 
and DDoS attack exploiting JavaScript within a web page. These attacks can be made just by accessing a 
web site without distribution of malicious codes and infection. Script-based cyber attacks are hard to 
detect with traditional security equipments such as Firewall and IPS because they inject malicious scripts 
in a response message for a normal web request. Furthermore, they are hard to trace because attacks 
such as DDoS can be made just by visiting a web page. Due to these reasons, it is expected that they 
could result in direct damages and great ripple effects. To cope with these issues, in this article, a 
proposal is made for techniques that are used to detect malicious scripts through real-time web content 
analysis and to automatically generate detection signatures for malicious JavaScript. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Recent introduction of Ajax and HTML5 technologies has enabled dynamic representation of 
web content, providing compatibility between a client and a server in web environment. 
However, the efforts to deal with new security vulnerabilities in these technologies, such as the 
awareness, countermeasure technology development, and standardization are still insufficient. 
In particular, web-based attacks using malicious scripts can bypass traditional security 
equipments, such as IDS, IPS and Web Firewall, because, unlike conventional malicious code 
attacks, they do not download an executable file directly, but they still can be made by 
combining normal built-in APIs in JavaScript. And also, it is getting harder to detect these 
attacks as they employ traffic encryption and script obfuscation. The Figure 1 illustrates how a 
DDoS attack can be made with JavaScript just by accessing a web page. Furthermore, Due to 
the October 2014 official standard of the W3C html5 is confirmed, the introduction of html5 is 
becoming accelerate.it is expected that cyber attacks exploiting vulnerabilities of new tags and 
APIs will grow rapidly. 
In this article, a proposal is made for techniques that are used to detect malicious scripts through 
collection of HTTP Web traffics and static/dynamic analysis, and to generate a detection 
signature automatically. Chapter 2 shows trends in related studies. Chapter 3 describes 
techniques that are used to collect and analyze web content for detection of malicious JavaScript. 
Chapter 4 describes more compact techniques that are used to generate a detection signature 
automatically with less false positive rate. Finally, Chapter 4 concludes the article. 
 Figure 1. A DDoS attack using JavaScript code 
 
2. RELATED WORK 
2.1. WebShiled 
Using a modified browser that consists of DOM API, HTML/CSS Parser and JavaScript Engine 
only, parse web content in proxy, turn it into the form of DOM Structure, and store it. Send the 
DOM Structure in the string format to the client. Send a script to the client only if it turns out 
that the script is safe after running it in the modified browser. However, prevention of 
exploitation of new vulnerabilities in HTML5 is insufficient. 
2.2. A signature for Malware Detection  
The method of Automatic generation of a signature for malware or worm can be divided into 5 
categories: vulnerability-based, content-based, content-shifting, semantic-aware and honeypot-
based. Among these, the content-based is the one that is proposed in this article. 
In the content-based method, a signature target set is determined based on traffic and the same 
malicious behavior, and then a signature is generated based on the content.  
A content-based signature [1] can be divided into Longest Common Substring, Longest 
Common Subsequence, Conjunction Signature and Bayes Signature. For the Longest Common 
Substring and Longest Common Subsequence, one retrieves the longest common substring and 
longest common subsequence respectively from the target set. For the Conjunction Signature, 
one uses a set of strings that appear in all targets, as a signature. For Bayes Signature, one 
checks whether a string in a sample appears in the malicious, and then determines whether the 
sample is malicious or not based on the percentage of malicious strings. 
2.3 BIRCH (Balanced Iterative Reducing and Clustering using Hierarchies) 
 BIRCH is an algorithm for hierarchical clustering for a large database. BIRCH allows addition 
of a new value in a clustered tree as a new entity is added, eliminating the need of re-clustering. 
BIRCH creates a CF (Clustering Feature) tree that has distance information for all leaves under 
a single node. As a new entity is added, it searches for the closest node. It adds the entity to the 
cluster of the closest node if the distance is same or shorter than threshold, or creates a new 
cluster and adds the entity to it if the distance is same or longer than threshold. 
3. WEB CONTENT ANALYSIS TECHNOLOGY  
For real-time detection of malicious JavaScript, one collects HTTP traffics by configuring a 
proxy server, and parses a HTML document and crawls a link to external resource in order to 
generate content for analysis. One performs static analysis, such as pattern-matching of web 
content, and dynamic analysis, such as checking whether obfuscated or not and the HTML5 tag 
percentage, to determine if the content is malicious. If a malicious script is found, remove the 
function that actually causes malicious behaviors before sending the script to the client. The 
Figure 2 shows the proposed system architecture that can be used to detect malicious scripts at 
network level.  
 
Figure2. System Architecture for Real-time Detection of Malicious Scripts 
It consists of modules: i) Forward-Proxy, ii) Web Content Generation Module, iii) Analytics 
Engine (Static/Dynamic Analysis), and iv) System Control Module. 
 
3.1 Forward-Proxy and Content Adapter 
For collection of web traffics, Squid-Proxy Server is configured in the in-line form 
between clients and Web Server, where all HTTP Request and Response packets are 
collected and Internet Content Adaptation Protocol (ICAP) is used to pass the received 
HTTP traffics to Web Content Control Module. Then, Web Content Control Module 
extracts the external JavaScript link data contained in the document, using HTML 
Parser received from Proxy Server, and collects resources for the link with a separate 
crawler to generate web content for analysis. 
 
3.2 Web Content Analysis  
 The term ‘web content’ refers to the entire document that includes both a HTML 
document and external resources. As shown in the Figure 3, web content goes through 
the fast static analysis process that performs pattern-matching based on Yara-RuleSet[2]. 
However, because some sources, such as those obfuscated, require additional analysis, 
they go through the dynamic analysis process that uses Rihno Browser Engine to run 
the script and extract call trace data for detection. 
 
 
Figure3. Configuration of Web Content Analytics Engine 
 
An input data set is in the format of JSON that consists of a HTML document, external 
JavaScript, and meta data (IP, port, protocol, domain, etc.). First, extract the primary 
key token to classify the type of the malicious behavior. Table 1 shows summary of 
basic keywords contained in each malicious behaviour 
 
Table 1. Examples of Basic Keywords for Each Malicious Behavior 
Malicious Type The Keyword 
DoS 
Attack 
HashDoS 
setInterval, open, send, ActiveXObject, XMLHTTP, 
XMLHttpRequest 
XML HttpObject DoS 
Scan 
Attack 
Network Scan 
open, ActiveXObject, XMLHTTP, XMLHttpRequest, 
Date, readyState 
Port Scan 
Geolocation coords, getCurrentPosition 
Web Socket parse, eval, WebSocket, JSON, send 
Web Worker DDoS postMessage, Worker, XMLHttpRequest, open, send 
 
Look up the signature for a malicious behavior and then perform signature-matching 
check to determine whether it is malicious or not. 
Additionally, score the JavaScript obfuscation and the percentage of HTML5 new tag 
usage in the entire document, and then perform dynamic analysis if the score is the same 
or above the predetermined level. JavaScript obfuscation check is performed because 
most of malicious JavaScript codes are obfuscated, and it is hard to determine whether it 
is malicious just by doing signature–matching during static analysis. The Figure 4 
illustrates process of the JavaScript obfuscation check[3]. As these are main 
characteristics of the obfuscated JavaScript, if a special character in a JavaScript string 
is frequently used, if there is a string with abnormal length, or if the entropy score of 
characters in the JavaScript is low, score them and if the total score is the same or above 
the cutoff, consider it obfuscated and perform dynamic analysis additionally. 
 
 
Figure4. JavaScript Obfuscation Analysis Process 
The table 2 illustrates the detection result of obfuscated JavaScript. Ngram (frequently 
used special characters), Word Size (string maximum length), the entropy by adjusting 
the weights of (JavaScript function name, variable name, Entropy analysis) were 
detected for the obfuscated script. When it detects a real-obfuscated script was 
confirmed that at least 87% detection rate.  
Table 2. Obfuscated JavaScript detection results 
Obfuscated source Samples 
Weight 
( Ngram:1.0,Entropy:1.0,
Wordsize:1.0 ) 
Base62 (Norma) packer encode method 45 38(Detection) 
A packed encode method 45 38(Detection) 
As Base64 encode method 10 10(Detection) 
Etc 24 22(Detection) 
sum 124 108(87.1%) 
 
And also, the usage of HTML5 tags is checked to detect malicious scripts such as 
jacking or cross-site scripts exploiting new tags of HTML5 (Canvas, Audio, Video). It 
has been arranged to perform dynamic analysis if a weight for each HTML5 tag is 
applied and the score is the same or above the predetermined level. 
During dynamic analysis in real world situation, a malicious JavaScript is executed 
using open source-based Rhino JavaScript Engine with a built-in sandbox, and 
JavaScript API Call Trace data is extracted and stored in XML data format. 
 The Figure 5 shows the Function Call Trace data for Port Scan malicious JavaScript, 
converted to XML format. 
 
Figure5. Trace Data of a Port Scan Malicious Script 
In this article, SimHash Algorithm[4] is proposed for comparison of JavaScript 
Function Call Trace similarities. SimHash utilizes Local Sensitive Hashing (LSH) for 
similarity comparison, and LSH maximizes conflicts between similar items rather than 
avoiding them. That is, the algorithm generates similar results for similar items. Using 
this function, regardless of the input value size, generate FingerPrint in an array in bit 
form just like the outcome of a normal hash function, and then use the hamming 
distance to measure the similarity 
 
4. TECHNIQUE OF GENERATING A SIGNATURE DEDICATED 
FOR DETECTION 
In this article, the malicious script, malicious type, obfuscation status, meta data and other data 
received from the analytics engine are used for automatic generation of signature for malicious 
JavaScript. It is proposed that a detection signature can be automatically generated by clustering 
with a malicious script from the registered malicious script pool, generating the combined 
signature, and refining the signature. Figure 6 illustrates the process of signature generation. 
 
Figure6. Automatic Generation of the Detection Signature for a Malicious Script 
4.1 Malicious Script Clustering 
In this article, it is proposed to use the script clustering technique for automatic 
generation of the detection signature for a malicious script. The goal of clustering is to 
streamline the signature itself and improve the false positive rate by grouping malicious 
scripts showing similar behaviors, and thus preventing extraction of unnecessary tokens. 
For each token of malicious JavaScript, calculate the Term Frequency-Inverse 
Document Frequency value and vectorize it. The TF-IDF[5] weight is a statistical figure 
that is used to evaluate the importance of a certain term in a document, and it can be 
calculated as the product of Term Frequency and Inverse Document frequency. 
The Term Frequency simply indicates how often a term appears in the document, and 
the Inverse Document Frequency provides general importance of the term. 
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 TF-IDF weight is calculated by multiplying the TF and IDF. 
 
Using the vector created with TF-IDF, perform hierarchical clustering in the Complete-linkage 
Cluster method. By improving BIRCH Algorithm for hierarchical clustering, quantify the vector 
distance and meta data (time similarity, IP, port and protocol), and then take their sum as the 
similarity score to determine whether malicious script clustering can be done.  
Figure 7 shows the clustering process through modified distance calculation. For clustering 
purpose, the score of significant meta data similarity is applied to distance measurements 
between basic vectors in order to form a clustering tree. 
 
Figure7. Modified Distance Calculation Formula and Meta Similarity Application 
4.2 Generating a Conjunction Signature 
Extract a common token from a malicious script file within the allowed distance in a cluster to 
generate a conjunction signature. Convert a token in the same form, such as IP, to a regular 
expression before processing. The Table 3 shows the combined signature generated with Port 
Scan JavaScript. 
Table 3. Examples of Conjunction Signature for Port Scan Detection 
output, targetIP, endtime, starttime, ate, appendChild, break, wordWrap, createElement, 
onRequest, ActiveXObject, majorPort, (?:(?:25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?) \ \.) 
{3 }(?:25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)XMLHttpRequest, style, open, innerHTML, Array, 
XMLHTTP, true, onreadystatechange, restime, Microsoft, Close, send, scanRes, 
getElementById 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we propose three performance indicators for the real time detection and blocking 
malicious scripts technique of performance measurement that are Real-time traffic throughput, 
Web access latency, the malicious script detection rate. For performance goal validation test bed 
was constructed as shown in Figure 8. 
 
Figure8. Performance Verification Test Environment 
The actual run a web browser 20 of the virtual environment at the same time was measured 
bandwidth and web access latency of about 1Gbps of bandwidth and latency of 2.95 seconds 
was confirmed that generation. 
Figure 9 is a graph showing the traffic handling capacity. 
 
Figure8. Traffic handling performance monitoring 
In order to measure the detection rates of malicious script XHR Dos, IP / Port Scan, Web 
Storage, File API, a total of seven samples of malware types and a total of more than 1400 tests 
were steady and verify the accuracy of approximately 95.3%. Table 4 shows the results of 
detecting malicious script. 
Table 4. Malicious script detection results 
Malicious Script Type Code obfuscation attack 
detection rates 
Modified the attack code 
positives 
XHR Dos 91%(55/60) 96%(58/60) 
IP Scan 86%(52/60) 93%(56/60) 
… 
Geolocation 88%(53/60) 100%(60/60) 
Average 89% 97% 
 
In this article, a proposal has been made for techniques that are used to detect malicious 
JavaScript and to automatically generate detection signatures. While it shows good results if the 
signatures generated using the proposed techniques are employed to detect malicious scripts and 
measure the latency time, it requires additional experiments on a larger pool of samples and 
higher volume of traffics. Furthermore, to deal with security vulnerabilities of new APIs in 
HTML5, it is planned to expand the scope of the proposed dynamic analysis and conduct related 
studies on detection of malicious behaviors by monitoring behaviors caused by JavaScript 
running,  
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